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Anaxagoras' Theory of Change; 
a Response to Parmenides*
Simplicius Phys. 163.18: "In the first book of his
Physics. Anaxagoras plainly declares that coming-to-be and 
perishing are coming together and coming apart. This is what 
he writes: 'Coming-to-be and perishing are customarily be­
lieved in incorrectly by the Greeks, since nothing comes-to-be 
or perishes, but rather it is mingled together out of things 
that are, and again comes apart. Thus they would be correct 
to call coming-to-be being mingled together, and perishing 
coming apart. "Ί
Empedocles: "When they [sc. the four roots— earth,
water, air, fire] are mingled together to form a man and so 
come to light [??], or to form the race of wild beasts, or of 
plants, or of birds, then men speak of 'coming-to-be'; and 
when they come apart, then they speak of 'ill-fated death'. 
They are not right to call them so, but I myself comply with 
the customary belief."2
These two fragments plainly make the same point, apart 
from the concession in Empedocles' last line. In addition, 
the verbal parallels are numerous: "coming-to-be" ( γΐν&σθαι);
"mingling" ( σψ,μίσγεται, μιγεντα ); "coming apart" (Piακρίνεται , 
άποκριθωσι ); "customary belief" ( νομίξουσι, νόμος). Almost all 
commentators agree that both philosophers are presenting a 
similar solution to the same problem--the problem posed by the 
argument of Parmenides B 8.1-21, which culminates in the con­
clusion "Hence coming-to-be is extinguished, and perishing is 
unintelligible."3 Both philosophers accept this conclusion, 
but argue that physical change can nevertheless be described 
without writing contradictions or nonsense, so long as it is 
interpreted as the "mingling together" and "coming apart" of 
"things that are" before, during and after the change, I 
shall take this as an agreed starting point.
This paper is a revised and shortened version of a 
paper entitled "Anaxagoras and the Eleatics" which I presented 
to the University of Alberta's "Workshop" on the Eleatics, at 
Edmonton, Alberta, in November 1974.
The recurrence of so many of the same words in two 
such short passages may suggest that one writer had read the 
other before writing his version, in spite of the distance 
between their home towns (something like 800 nasty sea miles), 
and the figurative distance between their cultural milieus.
But let us reserve judgment about that; it is possible that 
the common purpose of the two passages is sufficient to ex­
plain the echoes.
Assuming, then, that Anaxagoras was responding to 
Parmenides, I shall examine the nature of his response. I am 
aiming to show that the fragments and other evidence can and 
should be interpreted as belonging to a system whose main 
purpose is to provide an apparatus for explaining change with­
out "coming to be" or "perishing". The system makes one 
assumption which was denied by Parmenides: that it is pos­
sible and legitimate to "set up two forms in the mind for 
naming" (Parmenides B 8.53).^ That is to say, when sense 
perception distinguishes one thing as different in some way 
from another, according to Anaxagoras as opposed to Parmenides 
we can give an account of those two things, preserving their 
difference and duality, without breaking any epistemological 
rule. I am not sure whether Anaxagoras had, or even thought 
he had, any argument against Parmenides on this point; it may 
be that he simply contradicted Parmenides. Given this assump­
tion, it was possible for Anaxagoras to introduce motion with­
out any further assumptions (except Mind) since Parmenides, 
as it appears, had no argument against the possibility of 
motion except that it is impossible to distinguish any one 
thing from another at all, and therefore impossible to dis­
tinguish any place from any other.
I shall argue that we can understand Anaxagoras' 
theory of matter as a reasonable development from these first 
principles. Part of my motive in this paper is to argue 
against those who have written that Anaxagoras was responding 
not only to Parmenides, but also to Zeno. The case for re­
jecting their thesis is fairly strong, I believe, but not con­
clusive. Since my interpretation of the theory of matter can 
stand independently of my case for dating Zeno after Anax­
agoras, I have put the arguments about Zeno into an appendix.
Perhaps I can make a start from the concept that has 
caused most trouble to those who try to explain Anaxagoras: 
rerum quam dicit homoiomerian, as Lucretius puts it, no doubt 
surprised and happy to find that it fits into a Latin hexam­
eter. The abstract noun homoiomeria is attributed to An­
axagoras himself by Simplicius, Aetius, and other commentators, 
and it also turns up in the plural as a concrete noun, for 
which English historians use the version "homoiomeries".®
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No word of this type occurs in the fragments. The earliest 
attribution of anything comparable to Anaxagoras is in Aris­
totle, who says more than once:® "Anaxagoras made the homoi- 
omere [neuter plural adjective— the homoiomerous things] ele­
ments." In one placed he explains this phrase: "for exam­
ple, bone, flesh, marrow and the other things of which every 
part is synonymous with the whole." This is a familiar piece 
of Aristotelian terminology: he works with a three-tiered
analysis of matter, of which the first consists of the simple 
bodies (earth, water, air and fire), the second the homoi­
omerous bodies, and the third physical organs like arms and 
hands. The criterion for distinguishing the first bodies 
from the second is that the first cannot be said to be made 
of the second, whereas the second are made of the first. The 
criterion for distinguishing the second from the third is 
that the third do not, whereas the second do, break up into 
parts synonymous with the whole. Parts of a face are not face 
or faces, but parts of blood and bone are blood and bone [a 
difficult borderline case is suggested by the unpleasant mon­
ster in the story that was made of lip]. Please observe in 
passing that the second criterion does not make any distinc­
tion between the first tier and the second: earth, water,
air and fire are as homoiomerous as blood and bone.
Aristotle puts a determinate list of things into this 
second class. It includes animal tissues such as bone and 
blood, vegetable matter such as wood and bark, and minerals 
such as gold and iron.·*·®
Now, does Aristotle mean only that Anaxagoras treats 
all the items on his (Aristotle’s) list as elements?·**· Or 
does he mean that Anaxagoras used homoiomereity as a cri­
terion in compiling his own list of elements?*-2 Does the 
other evidence, with or without the support of Aristotle, 
warrant our attributing some principle of homoiomereity to 
Anaxagoras? If so, what part does this principle play in his 
theory?
Anaxagoras asks "How does hair come into being from 
what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh?"*·® I take 
it, along with everyone else, that this is what the grammar 
books call a "repudiating question". He means "hair could 
not come into being from what is not hair." We know from the 
fragment with which this paper began that there is no coming- 
to-be in the strict sense, but only "mingling together". Hair 
does not come into being; when someone's hair grows, it is 
because the existing hair gets more hair added to it. The 
additional hair is extracted from food, which contains hair.
This is what Lucretius says homoiomeria means in 
Anaxagoras :
3
4"Bones grow out of tiny little bones, he says,
and out of tiny little viscera
viscera grow, and blood is made
when many drops of blood congregate together,
and he thinks gold dust can compose gold,
and earth can grow out of little earths . . . "
The same point is made in more detail by the sober Aetius, 
probably following Theophrastus:
"Anaxagoras . . . declared the principles of the things
that are to be the homoiomeries. He thought it was 
quite unintelligible how a thing could come into being 
out of what is not or perish into what is not. Now we 
take food that is simple and of one form— bread, water—  
and out of it grow hair, vein, artery, flesh, nerves, 
bones, etc. Since that is what happens, we have to agree 
that in the food we take are all the things that are, and 
that everything grows from the things that are. In that 
food there are parts productive of blood, nerves, bones, 
etc.--theoretical parts, because we must not refer 
everything to sense perception, that bread and water pro­
duce these things, but there are in them parts that are 
to be distinguished in theory [ λδγςύ θεωρητά ]. So from 
the fact that in food the parts are similar [μερη.,δμοια ] 
to the things that are produced, he called them 'homoio—  
meries' and declared that they are the principles of 
things that are."15
This is a different interpretation of the term homoio- 
mere from Aristotle's.·^ According to Aristotle's criterion, 
a substance is homoiomerous if parts of it have the same name 
as itself. According to the principle attributed to Anaxagoras 
by Aetius, a "homoiomery" is a part of something (especially 
food) that is like something else (especially biological 
tissue). Breadl? is not, therefore, homoiomerous in Aris­
totle's sense, at least in the present analysis. Indeed, as 
Cornfdrd pointed out in his famous article, the requirement 
that bread should break down into parts that are not bread 
but bone, blood, flesh, etc., seems to mean that bread cannot 
be homoiomerous, in Aristotle's sense. And since Anaxagoras 
said "in everything there is a portion of everything", 
apparently meaning this as a generalization of statements 
like "there is blood, bone, flesh, etc., in bread", it appears 
that nothing can be homoiomerous in Aristotle's sense.
We can get out of this bind quite easily by bringing 
in a perfectly simple distinction. It is that things can be 
broken down into parts in more than one way. To put it into 
an Anaxagorean context, you can have ground beef (Anglice. 
"mince") or digested beef. It must be possible, if the theory 
is to work as an explanation of change without coming-to-be, 
that substances can be broken down non-homoiomerously, like
5digested beef. But that does not mean that they cannot, on 
different occasions or within different limits, be broken down 
homoiomerously, like ground beef. It is perfectly obvious 
that the substances which Aristotle called "homoiomere" are, 
at least within limits, divisible in this way.
There is no reason why Anaxagoras should have denied 
the possibility of the homoiomerous type of decomposition.
But does he need it at any crucial point in his theory of 
change, and is there any evidence that he made any use of it?
I cannot see that he had any need of it. He needed—  
and used--a concept that is very similar--so similar that it 
is easy to understand how the tradition may have become con­
fused. From B 6 we know that "everything has a share of 
everything", and from B 3 that "of the small there is no least 
but always a lesser". Thus any part, however small, of any 
substance has all the same ingredients in it as any other part, 
however large— namely, all that there are. In this sense, 
then, all the parts of a substance, however small, are homoia-- 
all alike. Just as Aristotle's homoiomerous things break 
up into ever smaller parts that have all the same character­
istics as each other and the whole, so Anaxagorean substances 
break up into ever smaller parts that have all the same in­
gredients .
But there is an essential difference, marked by the 
Anaxagorean principle "each thing is and was most evidently 
those things of which there is most in it" (B 12). This is 
what transforms Anaxagoras' theory into a theory of perceptible 
change. When we break down a quantity of a substance into 
parts, by whatever method, the parts always have all the same 
ingredients as each other and as the whole; but they do not 
always have them in the same proportions— and it is the pro­
portions of the ingredients that determine what the thing is 
"most evidently".·*·* A loaf of bread is bread, because what 
it has most of in it is bread, although it also has imper­
ceptible portions of blood, bone, flesh, hair and everything 
else. The same is true of a slice of the loaf, and a crumb 
of the slice. But when the crumb is eaten and digested, it 
is mixed with the substances of the body: the bread that
preponderated in the crumb is still there, but it no longer 
preponderates; the blood and bone and hair that were out- 
weighted in the crumb join their like as they are digested, 
in regions where they preponderate. In the body, bread pre­
ponderates nowhere, although there is a fair amount of bread 
in it--which returns to preponderance, perhaps, when the body 
excretes or dies and fertilizes the ground which feeds the 
wheat which makes more bread.
The point is this: there are no least parts; within
any given piece of any substance, there are smaller parts.
But there is nothing in the system that requires that below
6the level of perception the parts should all continue to be 
synonymous with each other and with the whole, since although 
the parts contain all the same ingredients, the preponderant 
ingredients, which determine what the part is called, may 
vary from part to part.^Q
So fár I have used a biological example (the diges­
tion of a piece of bread), which has a special feature that 
might lead to confusion. What normally alters the preponder­
ance in this process is that the bread is mixed with other 
substances in the body. But there are other ways of altering 
the preponderance between part and part without any additions 
to or subtractions from the whole with which one starts—  
simply by stirring the mixture, for example. On a large 
scale, this is just what happens at the beginning of Anaxag­
oras' cosmogony. All sorts of ingredients in the mixture, 
at first imperceptible "because of smallness" (i.e. because 
they do not preponderate anywhere), are separated out by the 
rotation started by mind until they do preponderate some­
where.
Now, given this distinction between Aristotelian 
homoiomereity, in which substances are divisible ad infinitum 
into parts that are synonymous with each other and with the 
whole, and an Anaxagorean principle which says that substances 
are divisible ad infinitum into parts that have the same in­
gredients as, but are not necessarily synonymous with, the 
whole and each other, we can come back to the question about 
the evidence. What evidence is there that Anaxagoras adopted 
the (Aristotelian) principle of homoiomereity and made use of 
it? G. B. Kerferd writes: "In fact the tradition that Anaxag­
oras held the [sc. Aristotelian] principle of Homoiomereity 
as part of his physical theory is just about as clear as one 
could possibly ask for."21 On the contrary, I shall now have 
to claim that there is no evidence whatever that Anaxagoras 
held the Aristotelian principle, if there is anything in the 
distinction I have drawn above.
It would be tedious to review all the evidence claimed 
for their position by Kerferd and others who agree with him; 
it will be enough, I hope, to indicate the lines on which I 
propose to move in examining it.
Aristotle's evidence has been so thoroughly discussed 
by others that there is no need add anything.22 χ believe 
that all Aristotle says is that Anaxagoras made the homoiomerê 
[sc. those substances that Aristotle refers to by this name] 
into elements, as opposed to others, including himself, who 
think they are reducible to simpler elements.
The doxographic tradition is more confused. Like 
modern commentators, the doxographers were not sure whether 
Aristotle’s reports meant that the Aristotelian homoiomere
7were elements for Anaxagoras, or also that these same elements 
were thought of by Anaxagoras as homoiomerous. They know of 
two senses in which the elements were homoiomerous: the sense
that I have analysed above (things have parts whose ingredi­
ents are all the same), and another, slightly different sense, 
in that things have parts which are like whatever they change 
into. But to the best of my belief there is no passage in 
the doxographic tradition that attributes to Anaxagoras homoi- 
omereity of precisely the Aristotelian kind, in which all the 
parts are synonymous with the whole.
There is one careful distinction to be added, however, 
in support of this claim. Anaxagoras' theory of nutrition is 
often described, as in the passage from Lucretius quoted above 
on p. , by saying that "bones grow out of tiny little bones", 
and so on. This is reasonably harmless. The same doctrine 
is put in different terms, by saying that bones are composed of 
( συνεστ&ναι and similar words) bits of bone. This is still 
correct, so long as it is interpreted as a thesis in the theory 
of growth. It means that things grow by the addition of por­
tions of their like, which were latent in their food or their 
environment. The statement that bone is made up from small 
portions of bone is very like the statement that bone is 
analysable into parts that are bone (i.e. Aristotelian homoio- 
mereity) ; but the former statement is not equivalent to the 
latter, does not entail the latter, and is not interpreted as 
the latter by any of the doxographers, to the best of my be­
lief (if I am wrong in the last clause, I shall have to claim 
that the doxographer has made the same mistake as the modern 
commentators).
We have taken as our starting point for explaining 
Anaxagoras the principle that there is no coming to be, but 
only mingling together of "things that are"; and we have seen 
how this principle works in accounting for perceptible change. 
When something like flesh grows, it does not come into being 
out of what is not flesh; the flesh that is there already 
grows by the addition of more flesh, portions of which are 
latent in food. This explanation can be generalized, as we 
have seen, to cover not merely growth by nutrition but other 
types of natural change as well. Hence the "things that are" 
include all the things that feature in natural change.
As a method of dealing with Parmenides, this theory is 
generally contrasted with that of Empedocles. Guthrie's ver­
sion may be taken as typical: 3^
"The solution of Empedocles had been to suppose that 
there was only a strictly limited number of elemental 
substances which deserved to be called existent. The
8rest, the world of 'mortal things’ which we suppose to 
be real, consisted simply of mixtures of the four ’roots' 
in different proportions, which could be dissolved with­
out infringing the rule of 'no becoming'. The condition 
laid down by Anaxagoras was stricter. On the Empedoclean 
theory, if it were possible to divide a piece of (say) 
flesh into small enough fragments, the elements would 
come to light and it would be flesh no longer. But 
Anaxagoras held that if this were even theoretically pos­
sible, then a definite substance, 'flesh', could perish. 
There was no reason for singling out certain forms of 
matter like earth or water as primary. Why should they 
be said to 'exist' more than others?"
But what about a man, or a city? If Anaxagoras' solution of 
the Parmenidean deadlock is to say that the hair that grows 
was in being, as hair, all the time, then are we to say that 
the man that is born and grows was in being, as a man, all 
the time? Somehow, because of the contrast with Empedocles, 
the commentators have always stressed the enormous number of 
kinds of being in Anaxagoras' system, but all of them, so far 
as I have observed, tacitly put a limit on the number. They 
assume, without noticing what they are omitting, that the list 
of beings will include all "the natural substances", in a 
sense in which a man or a horse is not a natural substance. 
Aristotle noticed the point, and confirms that Anaxagoras did 
indeed treat such items differently: even the Anaxagoreans,
he says, do not make a face out of faces, "nor any other of 
the things that are given a shape by nature". 4^
I suggest that it is at this point in Anaxagoras' sys­
tem that we find a role for the "seeds" mentioned in B 4 and 
by Aristotle, Theophrastus and Simplicius. We might take a 
hint from the first move in the physical argument in Epicurus' 
Letter to Herodotus : "Nothing comes to be out of nothing; for
everything would come to be out of everything, with no need 
of seeds." At the beginning of B 4a^5 Anaxagoras says:
"These things being so, it is right to think that there are, 
in all the things that are being put together, many things, 
of all kinds, and seeds of all things having forms of all 
kinds and colours and savours. And [sc. it is right to think 
that] men were composed and the other living creatures that 
have soul." And in B 4b: "Before these things were separated
off, when all things were together, no colour at all was evi­
dent: for the mixture of all things prevented it--the mix­
ture of the wet, the dry, the hot, the cold, the bright and 
the dark, much earth being in it too,26 and seeds unlimited 
in number, in no way like each other; for not even of the 
other things is one like the other. These things being so, 
it is right to think that all things are in the whole."
The lists in these two passages can be (and have been) 
read in a number of different ways. I want to suggest that
9there is some reason for thinking of the seeds as being at a 
higher level of organization than the "many things" or "the 
wet, the dry" etc. In the first list, the seeds have forms 
or shapes (’ιδέα: ) of all kinds, which makes us think of Aris­
totle's "things that are given a shape by nature," quoted 
above.27 in the second list, there seems to be some inference 
a fortiori ( obôe γαρ in 35.2) from the unlikeness of the 
"other things" (the wet, the cold, the dry, etc.?) to the 
unlikeness of the seeds, which might suggest that the seeds 
are less simple than the other things.
Anaxagoras rescues the natural substances that Aris­
totle calls "homoiomerous" from coming-to-be and perishing by 
supposing that they are always present but may be latent. He 
cannot do quite the same for what Aristotle calls "the things 
given a shape by nature", and so he comes as close to it as 
he can by speaking of "seeds". In the original mixture, when 
nothing was evident because of smallness, even if there were 
no men, there were the seeds of men. It is likely that Anax­
agoras would think of this as still satisfying the Parmenidean 
requirement of no coming-to-be, since it was a common view 
that the seed, in biological generation, contains all the 
ingredients of the adult and grows to adulthood only by "like-
to-like" addition.28
By a roundabout route I have come to the simplest of 
all interpretations of the "seeds" in B 4, by finding a role 
for seeds in an almost completely literal sense. The other 
fragments of Anaxagoras do not mention seeds; other ancient 
evidence on Anaxagoras' concept of seeds comes from a brief 
passage of Aristotle, Simplicius' comment on that, and a 
sentence of Theophrastus' Historia plantarum.29 Aristotle, 
in an extremely well known and much discussed passage, con­
trasts Anaxagoras with Empedocles, saying that whereas the 
latter makes earth, water, air and fire the elements out of 
which all other bodies are made, Anaxagoras takes the con­
trary view and says the homoiomerous bodies are elements, 
whereas air and fire are "mixtures of these and of all the 
other seeds." Simplicius in his comment says "Anaxagoras 
called the homoiomerous bodies, like flesh, bone, etc. 'seeds'". 
Modern commentators have concluded from this evidence that 
Anaxagoras spoke of seeds of flesh, bone, etc., and of the 
hot, the cold, etc., and sometimes of earth, water, etc.
They may be right to think that Anaxagoras had such a general 
theory of seeds, but I do not see any necessity for it in his 
system, and I do not think the evidence is strong enough to 
build on.
Immediately after mentioning seeds in B 4a, Anaxagoras 
continues with a description of the development of a cosmos: 
"These things being so . . . [it is right to think that] men
were composed, and the other living creatures that have soul. 
And that by the men were built cities, and works have been
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contrived, just as they are with us, and that there is a sun 
for them and a moon and the rest,, as with us, and that the 
earth grows many things of all kinds for them, whose fruits 
they gather into their dwellings and use. Now these things 
have been said by me about the separating off, that it would 
be separated off not only with us, but also elsewhere." I 
agree with Frankel30 that this should not be interpreted as 
implying a commitment to "other worlds"— a later doctrine.
It is something like a Gedankenexperiment. Given the initial 
conditions set out at the beginning of his book, Anaxagoras 
claims that it is only to be expected that things would turn 
out just as we see them to have turned out. The original 
mixture contained everything that now exists; it contained 
the whole mass of all the material stuffs of which the world 
is made, and seeds of all the structured things that exist 
in the world. Given, a motive agent that can discriminate31 
all these things, it is only to be expected that just such a 
world will emerge as the one in which we live.
If this analysis is right, Anaxagoras’ response to 
Parmenides' ban on coming-to-be is extremely simple--not at 
all the subtle and complex thing it has been made out to be.
His chief tool is the concept of latency (quaedam latitandi 
copia, Lucretius I 875).32 What men call "coming-to-be" is 
just the coming together of what was previously latent. This 
explains why it has proved so difficult to answer the ques­
tion, what are the elements in Anaxagoras’ system? As he 
says, there are things ( χρήματα) infinite in number (πλήθος ) ^  
in the original mixture (B 1), and one cannot know the "number 
of the things that are being separated off, either in theory 
or in fact" (B 7). We may allow that some things are obviously 
compounds, with identifiable components— for example, animals. 
In those cases, the components are permanent features of the 
mixture, and so is the principle of structure which is repre­
sented by the seed.34 Exactly how he handled this relation­
ship is a matter of guesswork. Perhaps there is flesh, bone, 
blood, etc., dispersed at large and not forming the seed of 
anything, while there is also flesh, bone, blood, etc. con­
centrated in seeds so as to give them their character by pre- 
doiinance— concentraterd in the seeds of animals, which are 
bloody, fleshy, bony, etc. Seeds should not be simply re­
ducible to such components, if the apparent coming-to-be of a 
man is to be explained in the standard way, avoiding offence 
to Parmenides, but they must contain them. I doubt whether 
earth, air, fire and water are special cases, as Aristotle 
implies; that is probably a mistake.35 So if pressed with 
the question, "What were the ingredients of the original mix­
ture?", Anaxagoras would probably reply that the list is in­
finite, but includes the hot, the cold, the wet, etc., earth, 
air, ether, etc., gold, iron, flint, etc., bark, leaf, root, 
flesh, blood, bone, etc., and seeds of fish, animals, men, 
etc. All these are "elementary" in the sense that they are 
irreducible, ungenerated and indestructible.
Appendix
The relation between Anaxagoras and Zeno cannot be 
determined with certainty, I believe. I shall argue for 
three points, each of them inconclusive and together making 
at best a plausible case. The first point is purely chrono­
logical: there is no good external evidence for thinking
that Anaxagoras wrote later than Zeno. The second point is 
that there is nothing in the wording or the content of Anax­
agoras' philosophy that cannot be reasonably explained with­
out the hypothesis that he was answering Zeno. The third is 
that what is often said to be a response to Zeno would be 
nothing but an ignoratio elenchi.
There is no need to do more than sketch the chrono­
logical arguments.^ The best evidence for Zeno's date comes 
from Plato, who says he was about 25 years younger than Par­
menides; and the dramatic setting of the Parmenides has Par­
menides about sixty-five, Zeno nearly forty, and Socrates 
very young--perhaps about 450 B.C.37 Others mention a 
floruit between 468 and 453.38 Plato mentions that Zeno 
wrote his book when he was very young. So it seems likely 
that the book was written between about 470 and 460.
According to the famous "autobiography" of Socrates 
in the Phaedo. when he was young he was very much interested 
in natural philosophy but was disappointed with its result 
until he heard someone reading from a book by Anaxagoras 
which said that Mind organized everything in the world. The 
implication is that Socrates did not hear Anaxagoras in per­
son. Anaxagoras is said to have come from Clazomenae to 
Athens at the time of Xerxes' invasion (480) when he was 
twenty— but he is also said to have begun to philosophize in 
Athens under the archonship of Rallias (456). These dates 
can be brought into harmony, as many editors do, by the de­
vice of emending "Rallias" to "Ralliades", The latter was 
archon in 480.
Guthrie‘S  includes among the things that "may be said 
with confidence" that Anaxagoras' book was finished later than 
467, the year of the fall of the meteorite at Aegospotami.
There is a long tradition associating Anaxagoras with this 
event, it is true— but the tradition says that he predicted it. 
The likeliest interpretation of that legend is that it arose 
from Anaxagoras' famous theory that the sun, moon and stars 
are all stones: if there are heavy stones in the sky, perhaps
they will fall one day. Guthrie says "the theory was sug­
gested or appeared to be confirmed by the fall of a stone 
apparently from h e a v e n . it hardly needs arguing that em­
pirical evidence is not a necessary precondition for Presocratic
11
12
theories. And the story of the prediction is explained much 
better if Anaxagoras’ book preceded the meteorite.^·*·
The later chronology of Anaxagoras’ life is extremely 
confused.42 χ not think there is any firm evidence that
would tend to force us to abandon the thesis that his book 
was written before 467. If so, then the chronological argu­
ments suggest that Zeno probably wrote after Anaxagoras.
There are two fragments of Anaxagoras that are said 
to constitute a reply to Zeno;43
"For of the small there is no least but always a lesser 
(for what i¿ cannot not be)--but also of the large there 
is also a larger. And it is equal to the small in 
πλήθος , but with respect to itself each thing is both 
great and small" (B 3).
"These things having been thus separated out, it is right 
to understand that all things are neither less nor more 
(since it is not possible that there be more than all), 
but all things are equal always" (B 5).
To take the second first: the allegation is that it 
is a deliberate echo of Zeno B 3: "If there are many, it must 
be that they are as many as they are and neither more nor less 
than themselves." Zeno’s proposition, in its context, is one 
half of an antinomy which aims to prove, from the premiss 
"there are many", both "they are finite" and "they are in­
finite". From this contradiction, Zeno wants to deduce that 
the premiss "there are many" is false. Anaxagoras has no 
argument against this: the most he could be doing is contra­
dicting Zeno by saying that "being neither more nor less than 
themselves" does not entail being finite. But the word 
"always" shows that he is making quite a different point, 
that the total of things does not change in time♦44 As I 
have shown earlier in this paper, this proposition is needed 
as part of Anaxagoras’ answer to Parmenides, and there is no 
need whatever to erect a Zenonian target for him to fire at.
On the contrary, Zeno's argument in B 3 might well be 
aimed at Anaxagoras. The latter shows no sign of noticing 
that if things are as many as they are (which is entailed 
by "all things are equal always") then they are finite. So 
he asserts both "all things are equal" and "all things are 
infinite". Zeno could be looking for a contradiction in
this.45
The first of Anaxagoras' fragments quoted above, B 3, 
is said to be connected with the Zenonian argument against 
plurality contained in B 1-2.46 The conclusion of the antin­
omy in this argument is: "Thus if there are many, they must
be both large and small--small so as to have no size, large
so as to be infinite
13
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To take the second arm firsts Zeno argues that any­
thing having size must be divisible into parts having size, 
"to say this once is to say it always", therefore anything 
having size must have an infinite number of parts having 
size, and therefore it must be infinitely large. So far as 
I can see, there is nothing in Anaxagoras that refers to this 
argument.
As to the first arm: Zeno argues that each of the
alleged "many" must have no size, because otherwise it will 
be divisible and so not be a "one". Again, there appears to 
be nothing in Anaxagoras that takes note of this.
What Anaxagoras says can be wholly explained as part 
of his defence of his principles of latency and predominance. 
Change from A to B is possible, in his view, only if B is 
latent in A. So if A is so small that it contains nothing 
latent in it, it cannot change. Since he apparently wanted 
to set no limits to change, he had to maintain that there is 
nothing so small that it can contain nothing latent in it—  
that is, "there is no least, but always a lesser". Without 
this assumption, the "portions" of everything that are in 
everything could be eliminated simply by taking smaller and 
smaller pieces.
The theory of change depends on the proportions of 
the ingredients of a thing: the possibility of change de­
pends on there being a relatively large and a relatively small. 
Any limits on the large and the small would limit the possi­
bility of change. Hence for any given size, there must be a 
"larger", if latent things can be of any size and can cease 
to be latent.
When he says the large is "equal to the small in 
πλήθος" he probably means that both the large and the small 
contain an equal number of ingredients--namely, all that 
there are. The same is said in B 6: "There are equal por­
tions, in number, of the large and the small."
The last clause of B 3, "with respect to itself, each 
thing is both great and small" is a little puzzling. He has 
just been talking about comparative sizes— small and smaller, 
large and larger. One might expect him to say that with re­
spect to itself each thing is neither large nor small. I 
suspect that what he means is that without comparisons a thing 
is whatever you like to call it— large or small. Large and 
small are entirely relative terms.47
Anaxagoras' theory of infinite divisibility— "of the 
small there is no least but always a lesser" (B 3)— is then 
a deduction from three propositions in his response to Par­
menides:
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(1) There is no coming-to-be or perishing.
(2) Nevertheless, a thing perceived as A can change
into a thing perceived as B.
(3) This is possible only if B is latent in A.
There is no reason to think that he was unable to work this 
out without a nudge from Zeno. On the contrary, if he did 
work it out after reading Zeno, then he either stupidly mis­
understood or shamelessly ignored Zeno’s whole point. For 
Zeno introduced the infinite divisibility of "what is" only 
to show that it leads to ridiculous and unacceptable conse­
quences. If it is infinitely divisible into an infinite 
number of ultimate units, then it is impossible to give a 
non-contradictory account of these units (B 1-2). If it is 
infinitely divisible without any ultimate units, then you 
can never traverse it or give any non-contradictory account 
of its limits (the Dichotomy and the Achilles).48 The Atom- 
ists and Aristotle tried to deal with this powerful attack 
on divisibility; not Anaxagoras.
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Anaxagoras’ Theory of Change -- Notes
Anaxagoras B 17. This seems an appropriate moment 
to defend the fragments of Anaxagoras quoted by Simplicius 
from the attack on their authenticity in the book by Gershen­
son and Greenberg. (Full references for all the modern lit­
erature cited are given in the Bibliography, pp. ).
These authors conclude that "the quotations from 
Anaxagoras to be found in Simplicius' commentaries . . . are
useless as sources from which to reconstruct Anaxagoras' 
thought" (p. 358) on four grounds:
a) "The same 'quotations' appear differently in different 
places." But this is also true of Simplicius' quotations from 
Plato's Timaeus, which he certainly knew well. For example,
Trn 51 e 6-52 d 1 is quoted by Simplicius in Ph. 224.30ff 
(call this A) and 539.14ff (B), with the following differences 
(according to Diels' apparatus and text):
52 a 2 οΰτε cÆrro εΊσδεχομενον α: οΰτε lv.1. aíra¡j 
ε’ι ς aοτο είσδεχδμ,ενον b 
a 8 αυ A; οώτδ . B 
b 1 ,γενέσθαι A: γενεοχν, B-
c 1 εγερθέντες A: διεγερθεντες B
c 2 λέγειν A: ε'ιπείν B
c 4 τι vît it A:St om. Bc 6 ως εως αν τι
c 7 ποτέ kl om. B
ως εάν τι B
Some of this text is quoted elsewhere by Simplicius, with 
different variations (e.g. 43.15ff omits άλλβθεν in 52 a 3). 
With all these variations, Simplicius preserves the sense 
perfectly; so why not also in the case of Anaxagoras?
b) "It is often impossible to tell where the ''quotations’ 
begin or end" (p. 360). Agreed; but it is often reasonable 
to believe that one is right in the middle.
c) "The quotations are full of interpolations" (p. 363). This 
assertion is based only on the fact that Simplicius often in­
terpolates remarks of his own in citations from Aristotle, for 
which we have a control, and on Gershenson's and Greenberg's 
disapproval of the content of some clauses in what Simplicius 
attributes to Anaxagoras.
d) "Simplicius did not have Anaxagoras* book" (p. 370). The 
case on this ground is very flimsy; one could make as strong 
a case against Simplicius’ quotations from Empedocles. G. 
Strohmaier in CMG Suppl. Or. Ill (1970) p. 90, argues that 
Galen had a copy of Anaxagoras’ book (I owe this reference to
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Mr. Vivian Nutton). Simplicius claims confidently (Ph.
166.16) that he has οώτηήλέξις of Anaxagoras.
Of course we must always be cautious in accepting 
any alleged quotation as a genuine fragment of any Presocratic 
philosopher. We are always dealing with what is relatively 
reliable at best. In my view (and nearly everyone else's), 
Simplicius is a relatively reliable source for Anaxagoras.
2Empedocles B 9, from Plutarch adv. Coloten. The text 
is uncertain in three places. In the last line, the negative 
is a supplement, to correct the metre, suggested by Wytten- 
bach and adopted by most subsequent editors. If it is wrong, 
the line means; "But they are right to call them so [sc. pro­
vided that they understand what they are doing], and I myself 
comply . . . "
3
Aristotle Ph. 187 a 26 says Anaxagoras accepted the 
common opinion of the physikoi that nothing comes to be from 
nothing. Simplicius in his commentary (162.11ff) notes that 
Parmenides presented the arguments for this position, and 
goes straight on to say (162.26) "Anaxagoras accepted this as 
an axiom." He proceeds at once to give his outline of Anax­
agoras' philosophy as an attempt to account for perceptible 
change while accepting this axiom.
Recently Professor Martin L. West has published a dis­
senting opinion (EGP&O p 219) : "Why must we suppose that they
[sc. Empedocles and Anaxagoras] are seeking an alternative 
answer to 'the problem posed by Parmenides'?" However, Mr. 
West's analysis of Parmenides, which follows, is so frivolous 
that it would be surprising if he thought anyone needed to 
compose an answer.
^For this reading of the line, see my "Notes on Par­
menides", pp. 5-6.
5Ás Professor West puts it (p. 232), "we also find 
Zeno playing around with infinite divisibility." The argu­
ments connecting Anaxagoras' position with Zeno, to which Mr. 
West airily alludes, are set out by Gigott, Raven and Calogero, 
among others.
®0n these words, see Guthrie's note, HGPh II 325-6.
^Note Shorey's argument (CPhilol 1922, 350) that Plato 
Protag. 329 d-e tells against the use of any such term by
Anaxagoras himself. See also Mathewson, and Strohmaier pp. 
89-90.
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8Ph♦ III 4, 203 a 19; Metaph. I 3, 984 a 11; De cáelo 
III 3, 302 a 28; GÇ I 1, 314 a 18.
^The last reference in the preceding note.
■^See the list in Meteor. 388 a 13-20.
^So Guthrie II 326, and others.
•^So Kerferd, in Mourelatos Pre-S p 498, and others.
13B 10. The actual words are, I think, less well 
authenticated than the Simplicius fragments, but the accuracy 
of the content is amply confirmed.
14Lucretius I 835-40. Lucretius, who is opposing the 
theory, spoils it by using bones (ossa), viscera and earths 
(terrae) as count nouns instead of mass nouns.
■'■’Aetius I 3 5 = DK 59 A 46. Compare Theophrastus, 
cited by Simplicius PJb. 27.11 (in DK 59 A 41). Aetius differs 
from Lucretius in using homoiomeria to mean a part that is 
like that of which it is a component, whereas Lucretius uses 
it to refer to the principle that there are such parts.
Ί C
°According to Cornford (A & F II, p. 316 n9), it is 
the "irresponsible conjecture of a doxographer."
"^Bread, Aetius* example, is a bad one, because it 
is an artificial substance, and as such it is doubtful whether 
it would be included in Anaxagoras* elements. Substitute 
"flour".
18This may be an appropriate occasion to pay tribute 
to the late Arthur L. Peck, who did excellent work on Anax­
agoras which is perhaps not as well known as it should be.
His distinction between Aristotle's use of homoiomeres and 
the doctrine of Anaxagoras to which the name homoiomereia was 
attached is very close to mine: "The portions in anything
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you care to choose are similar to the portions in any other 
thing, for there is a portion or part of everything in them 
all. What could be a more exact name for this doctrine than 
Homoiomereia. the similarity of parts, or, as Lucretius puts 
it, rerum homoeomeria? This has the advantage not only of 
fitting the doctrine exactly, but of being a clear echo of 
the famous phrase iv παντι παντός μοίρα £νεστι " (CQ XXV 1931, 
p. 118). The difference is that Mr. Peck refers to the 
similarity of parts of different things, whereas I think the 
Aristotelian usage of the term homoiomeres probably led the 
doxographers to use cognate terms to refer to parts of the 
same thing.
Cyril Bailey (G_k. Atomists, p. 551) gets the essential 
point right--that homoiomereity of the Aristotelian type can­
not help in an explanation of physical change— but his account 
of the theory is spoilt, in my view, by his interpretation of 
the "seeds" of fr. 4 as particles. It is important to realise 
that particles play no part in Anaxagoras' theory (Lanza's 
1963 article is good on this point): with some justice, he
makes of it a general criticism of the "studiosi anglosassoni").
Charles Mugler may also be right in his account of the 
concept of homoiomereity as applied to Anaxagoras (pp. 358-63 
of the article cited in the bibliography), but his exposition 
leaves so many questions unanswered that I cannot be sure. I 
do feel sure, however, that much of the rest of his article 
is wrong— particularly his claim that Anaxagoras' prime target 
was Leucippus.
use the expression "break down into parts" delib­
erately as a cover-all. Gregory Vlastos makes use of a dis­
tinction very similar to mine (though more complicated, be­
cause of his theory of "powers" and "seeds"), but expresses 
it by distinguishing "division" from some other process of 
rearrangement (A & F II, pp. 338-39). But there is no evi­
dence and no a priori reason, so far as I can see, why divi­
sion, as well as rearrangement, should not result--at some 
stage, sometimes— in parts with different ingredients pre­
dominating. There is some evidence for this: at the end of
B 12, Anaxagoras writes: "Mind is all alike, both the greater
and the smaller." This implies that in other things the 
greater and the smaller are not all alike. The next sentence 
appears to say as much (or even more): ετερον δε obôev
'εστιν δμοιον οίιδενί.
(I owe this point to Mr. Malcolm Schofield.)
20Anaxagoras in the fragments says only that the pre­
ponderant ingredients determine what the thing is "most evi­
dently". The Derveni papyrus, which recalls many Anaxagorean 
ideas, says "each thing jLs called from what predominates."
(See Burkert, Ejt. Philos. , p. 445.)
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Mr. Colin Strang makes an essential point (A & F II, 
p. 361ff) in his distinction between "common and elemental 
substance". A piece of what is commonly called "gold" is so 
called because it has a predominance of pure, elemental gold 
in it. This is just plain common sense. When I drink a 
glass of water in Princeton, I still call it "water" (even if 
reluctantly), although it contains heaven knows what other 
ingredients. What is peculiar about Anaxagoras is that he 
denies that any pure substance (except Mind) can be wholly 
isolated from any other. It is sometimes said that this gives 
rise to an epistemological problem (what jLs water, if it 
never exists in a pure state?). If so, we should have to say 
that no non-chemist knows what he is talking about when he 
asks for a glass of water.
^In Mourelatos Pre-S, p. 498.
2 2See especially Peck and Mathewson.
23A & F II, p. 272.
^De cáelo III 4, 302 b 25. It is worth noticing that 
this observation might be used, if we like, to turn the usual 
account of the history upside down. For example, Vlastos 
writes (in A & F II, p. 327): "No Ionian had ever said that
earth had been 'in' the original matrix. Empedocles had said 
just that, precisely because he had endowed earth with Par- 
menidean being. Anaxagoras takes a long step in the same 
direction. He holds that earth, air, aether, as well as hair, 
flesh and every other substance are 'in' the primitive mix­
ture, for they all have Parmenidean being." Could we not put 
it this way instead? Anaxagoras saved mortal men from Par­
menidean non-being by making their components and their seeds 
into entities with Parmenidean being. But Empedocles went 
much further in the same direction, by claiming that these 
extravagantly varied Parmenidean beings could be reduced to 
just four? And the Atomists further still, by cutting out 
irreducible qualitative differences altogether? Is there any­
thing in this line of thought?
I put this point in the form of a question, because I 
am not sure whether Empedocles wrote before Anaxagoras or 
vice versa, and whether either of them knew the work of the 
other at the time of writing. For an extensive discussion of 
the arguments, see O’Brien's 1968 article; he concludes that 
Empedocles wrote later than Anaxagoras, and was influenced by 
him. F. Solmsen now writes: "Reasons that have been communi­
cated to me but are not yet in the public domain have streng­
thened my inclination to regard Anaxagoras as later than
20
Empedocles" (AGPh 1975, p, 123 n2). It will be interesting 
to learn more about this important leak.
25For the interpretation of this fragment, see espe­
cially Hermann Frankel, WuF 284ff., and Gregory Vlastos in 
A & F II, 354-60.
DK prints consecutively as fr. 4 twenty lines that 
are never quoted consecutively by Simplicius. At PJh. 156.2ff., 
he quotes the first three lines, followed by the second para­
graph; but this second paragraph is introduced by "φησί "--a 
hint that a new quotation is beginning. Taken as a whole, 
the evidence suggests that what DK prints as two paragraphs 
of fr. 4 is really two separate fragments; so following 
Frankel, Lanza and others, I call them 4a and 4b. (Frankel 
actually divides 4b into two as well.)
Frankel interprets the whole of 4a as in the condi­
tional mood. He first explains the omission of αν with the 
infinitives συμπαγηναι etc. as perhaps "ein Archaismus von 
Anaxagoras’ Sprache" (p. 280). G. E. L. Owen is quoted as 
objecting to this interpretation (see A & F II, 360 nl7, and 
379 n28) that it cannot survive the indicative χρωνται in DK 
II 34.14. But, as Frankel himself seems to suggest (p. 281), 
his interpretation does not depend on the infinitives being 
potential. The whole construction is dependent on the opening 
phrase: τούτων ούτως £χδντων, χρή δοκεΤν . The general sense
is this: granted that the initial conditions are as we have
described them, it is right to suppose (i.e. it is only what 
one would have expected) that . . . "men were composed . . . 
and there are cities built by the men . . . just as we see 
around us ( ώσπερ παρ'ήμ'ΐν )." The potential optative in the 
last sentence follows quite naturally: given the initial
conditions, the same would happen anywhere. There is no 
commitment to "other worlds" here.
0 f
"There is no satisfactory explanation of the mention 
of earth in this connection, unless earth were one variety of 
seed" (Vlastos, in A & F II, 343 nl7). . It may be that earth 
is mentioned because of its connection with the growth of 
seeds. That is its role in B 4a (line 12 in DK).
27Vlastos in A & F II, 342 n7 points out that 
need not mean "shape", but may mean "form" in a quite general 
sense. True; on the other hand, Empedocles' use of the word, 
which Vlastos claims to be equally general, in the expression
παντοίαις ίδέησιν έψηρβτα, θαύμα ’ιδεσθαι
(Β 35.17) is precisely to refer to the properties of complex 
organisms.
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^®See Vlastos in A & F II, 324-25, with the references 
to biological texts in his note 20.
29Pe cáelo III 3, 302 a 28ff (DK A 43), Simplicius 
603.7ff (not in DK) and Theophrastus HP III 1, 4 (DK A 117). 
There are some other passages, quoted by Lanza, Anassagora,
A 111, A 113, A 117. Censorinus 6.6 and 6.8 (A 111) has a 
note about the role of animal seed in bringing about resem­
blances between parents and children. Theophrastus De causis 
plantarum 1 5 , 2  and Varro De re rustica I 40, 1 (both in 
A 117) report on seeds of plants carried imperceptibly in air 
or water. Irenaeus II 14, 2 (A 113) extends this idea to 
animal seed.
Perhaps a mite of confirmation for my interpretation 
may be found here: what was worth remembering about Anaxag­
oras was that he held a theory according to which the seeds 
of plants and animals are latent in air and water. (I am 
grateful to Mr. David Sider for drawing ray attention to these 
passages.)
^®See above, n. 25.
3-*-The ambiguity of this word is of course deliberate.
32
Not the same as potency, although it may be a fore­
bear of it.
^2In spite of Calogero's argument that πλήθος may 
mean no more than "amount" or "quantity" (Storia p. 257), I 
think it means number here.
^This is not inconsistent with the reports that 
Anaxagoras spoke about" the origin of living forms (Diogenes 
Laertius 2.9, Hippol. I 8, 12). They originated in the same 
sense as every other feature of the cosmos--by "separating 
out" of the original mixture.
•*~*De cáelo III 3, 302 a 28ff = DK A 43, quoted above. 
For an explanation of the mistake, see Vlastos in A & F II, 
339-40.
^Because the evidence is such that however meticu­
lously one examines it, it will never make a conclusive case. 
Perhaps the simplest argument is this: Anaxagoras wrote the
22
first prose treatise (Diogenes Laertius II 11); Zeno wrote in 
prose; therefore, Zeno wrote after Anaxagoras. Unfortunately, 
both the meaning and the truth of Diogenes' statement are un­
certain.




A Xae wrote only one (Diogenes Laertius II 6) but 
apparently it filled more than one roll, since Simplicius 
refers to "the first of his Physica" (Ph. 155.26 and 163.19).
^See Davidson.
See especially Raven in C() 1954 and in KR, p. 370-71, 
Guthrie HGPh II 289ff., Calogero Storia 256ff. For a re­
buttal, see Strang in A & F II, 366-67.
^This was pointed out by Strang, A & F II, 377 nl3.
^3But it is not necessary to think that Zeno had 
Anaxagoras in mind as a specific target. He was systemati­
cally looking for contradictions to be derived from "there are 
many", and it is not necessary to think that all the types of 
pluralism that he attacked were actually asserted by anyone.
4 6On this, see Strang, A & F II, 366-67.
^This conclusion is the same as Calogero's (Storia 
pp. 261ff) but I differ from him about many details.
^®For this interpretation of Zeno, see G. E. L. Owen, 
in A & F II, ch. V, and my Two Studies, pp. 69-70, reprinted 
in Mourelatos PreS, pp. 360-61.
Anaxagoras' Theory of Change.
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